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HE concept of federalism, which describes the complex relation-
ship between the states and the federal government, is one of the
most revered sacred cows on the American political scene. Conserva-
tives and liberals alike extol the virtues of state autonomy whenever
deference to the states happens to serve their political needs at a par-
ticular moment. Yet both groups are also quick to wield the power of
the supremacy clause,' while citing vague platitudes about the need
for uniformity among the states, whenever a single national rule in a
particular area furthers their political interests.
The relationship between the ideal of federalism and the reality of
the supremacy clause thus emerges as one of the most convenient of
political expedients.2 This Article seeks to place this relationship
within the context of the economic theory of public choice.
Building on the earlier work of Professor George Stigler,3 Profes-
sors Sam Peltzman4 and Gary Becker 5 have specified the core charac-
teristics of public-choice theory by developing what has come to be
known as the "political-support-maximization" model, which has
replaced the older cartel model as a tool for predicting political
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. I received helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this Article that were presented at law school faculty workshops at the University of Chicago,
Cornell University, New York Law School, and the University of Virginia. I received
extremely useful advice and comments from Peter H. Aranson, Henry N. Butler, Lloyd R.
Cohen, Richard A. Epstein, Clayton P. Gillette, Fred S. McChesney, Michael W. McConnell,
Henry G. Manne, Roberta Romano, Robert E. Scott, Steven H. Shiffrin, Cass R. Sunstein, and
Robert D. Tollison.
I U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
2 See McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design (Book Review), 54 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1484, 1488 (1987) ("[Flor most people ... issues of federalism take second seat to
particular substantive outcomes.").
3 Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
4 Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211 (1976).
5 Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J.
Econ. 371 (1983).
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behavior. The political-support-maximization model has been
employed successfully to define regulatory action,6 reversal of regula-
tory action,7 and regulatory forbearance.8
As yet, however, the model provides no explanation of why federal
lawmakers ever would defer to state regulators by allowing such local
lawmakers to regulate in their stead. Given the federal government's
broad authority under the supremacy clause to preempt local rules, 9
the political-support-maximization model would seem to predict that
the federal government will always exercise its power to preempt local
law-either to regulate or to forbear from regulating-in order to
obtain for itself the political support associated with providing laws to
interested political coalitions. But contrary to this prediction, we
observe that the federal government willingly defers to local govern-
ments over a wide range of issues by allowing them to continue to
supply laws.
Nor has Congress simply ceded regulatory authority over local
issues to local governments and retained for itself exclusive authority
to intervene in national affairs, as a public-interest defense of federal-
ism would predict."° The federal government has, at times, taken a
lively interest in regulating purely local matters, such as the responsi-
bility of the states to provide funds for the education of handicapped
children or the issuance of charters to banks that are unable to do
business beyond the borders of the state in which their main office is
located. Conversely, Congress has ceded to individual states the
power to dictate what is, in effect, national policy in certain impor-
tant areas. For example, Delaware's corporate law and South
Dakota's law of usury both have truly national effects yet are promul-
gated at the state level.1
6 See, e.g., Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model with an
Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & Econ. 311 (1987).
7 See, e.g., Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J.L.
& Econ. 273 (1984).
8 See, e.g., McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. Legal Stud. 101 (1987).
9 See Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709 (1985); Nine
for the Seesaw, The Economist, Mar. 2, 1985, at 21.
10 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1494-96.
11 Delaware's corporate laws have a national effect because they control the internal affairs
of many major corporations whose principal business activities are located elsewhere. South
Dakota's law of usury has a national effect because loans originated in South Dakota,
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This Article seeks to show that deference to local regulators is in
fact consistent with the political-support-maximization model that
provides the theoretical underpinning of the economic theory of regu-
lation. As will be seen, just as the political-support-maximizing solu-
tion for a particular issue may be for Congress to regulate in a specific
area (or to prevent regulations from being implemented), for other
issues Congress and administrative agencies will find that they can
maximize political support by refraining from regulating-even when
they know that regulators at the state level will step in and regulate in
their stead.
While at first blush it may appear that this sort of regulatory defer-
ence permits local lawmakers to capture all of the gains associated
with a particular regulatory enactment, this is not the case. The
supremacy clause allows federal lawmakers to obtain political support
in exchange simply for agreeing to permit local lawmakers to retain
regulatory authority over certain issues. Current interpretations of
the supremacy clause permit federal law to override state law not only
in cases of actual conflict, such as when federal and state law provide
different standards, but also where Congress is thought by the courts
to have prohibited parallel state legislation by implication. 12 Thus,
the supremacy clause is a considerable source of political rents for
Congress because it allows Congress to obtain political support by
permitting independent or concomitant state regulation at little or no
political cost to itself.
This Article attempts to specify the conditions under which Con-
gress will choose to delegate the responsibility for regulating to state
governments. According to the theory presented here-and consis-
tent with the political-support-maximization model of public-choice
theory-Congress will delegate to local regulators only when the
political support it obtains from deferring to the states is greater than
the political support it obtains from regulating itself. Deference to
local regulators is sometimes the strategy by which federal regulators
maximize political support from interest groups. Deference to local
regulators will also occur when legislating will cause Congress to lose
particularly purchases made with credit cards issued by South Dakota banks, are subject to
South Dakota law.
12 See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law § 9.1 (3d ed. 1986). The
supremacy clause also allows Congress expressly to prohibit state action. Id.
1990]
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political support. 13
The important point here is that deferring to state lawmakers does
not deprive federal lawmakers of political support. But instead of
receiving political support for regulating, they will receive political
support for agreeing to allow local regulators to make local laws.
Political support to members of Congress for deferring to state regula-
tors may come from the relevant interest groups directly, or it may be
channeled through a conduit such as the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors or the National Governors Conference. In either case,
the result will be the same: Congress receives political support in
exchange for deferring to state lawmakers on a particular regulatory
issue.
The theory here might be described as a "franchise theory of feder-
alism." In an ordinary business franchise, the owner of a product,
service, or technology, rather than market its own goods, often will
choose to sell another firm the rights to market them under a
franchise arrangement. Under certain circumstances firms find it in
their interests to employ this sort of contractual arrangement. 14 This
Article identifies three general situations in which Congress will
"franchise" the right to regulate in a particular area to the states: (1)
when a particular state has developed a body of regulation that com-
prises a valuable capital asset and federal regulation would dissipate
the value of that asset; (2) when the political-support-maximizing out-
come varies markedly from area to area due to the existence of spatial
monopolies, variegated local political optima, and variations in voter
preferences across regions; and (3) where Congress can avoid poten-
tially damaging political opposition from special-interest groups by
13 See infra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
14 See Brickley & Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J.
Fin. Econ. 401 (1987); Caves & Murphy, Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets,
42 S. Econ. J. 572 (1976); Klein & Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & Econ. 345, 349-54 (1985); Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the
Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & Econ. 223 (1987).
The use of the franchise metaphor is not to suggest that the concerns involved in Congress's
decision whether to regulate exactly mimic those of a firm considering whether to become a
franchisor. One important difference is that in the case of Congress, franchise fees (political
support) are normally paid by the customer (interest groups) rather than by the franchisees
(state regulators), although state legislators may in some circumstances pay for the right to
regulate. The development of a comprehensive franchise theory of federalism is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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putting the responsibility for a particularly controversial issue on state
and local governments.
Part I of this Article places the model presented here within the
context of the general economic theory of regulation and explains
why interest groups often find that federal law is superior to state law
in providing them with wealth transfers. Part II elaborates the cir-
cumstances in which Congress maximizes its own political support by
deferring regulation to local lawmakers.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE AND THE ECONOMIC
THEORY OF REGULATION
Under the economic theory of regulation, politicians can obtain
payments (which may come in the form of honoraria, campaign con-
tributions, indirect political support, and, of course, outright bribes)
from interest groups in exchange for regulation.15 The model posits
that politicians maximize the aggregate political support that they
receive from interest groups by supplying the legal rules that result in
the highest net receipt of support.16
The first sort of interest-group activity observed by public-choice
theorists was rent seeking. Politicians would supply rent-creating reg-
ulation to the groups best able to pay for it, sometimes by establishing
cartels in particular industries, 17 but often in more subtle ways. 18
Later it was seen that exogenous shocks could alter an existing polit-
15 See Berke, How Cash Is Given to Politicians' Interests, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1989, § E,
at 4; Easterbrook, What's Wrong With Congress?, The Atlantic, Dec. 1984, at 57, 70-72.
16 More specifically, the model posits that legal rules are supplied to those groups that bid
the most for them and that compensation is provided in the form of political support. Because
particular aspects of much legislation, especially complicated legislation, affect some groups
more than others, some groups will be more interested than others in specific aspects of a
particular legislative package. The precise contours of the resulting law will reflect a political
equilibrium representing the preferences of a variety of groups. See Peltzman, supra note 4, at
222-24.
In addition, the economic theory of regulation predicts that laws will tend to benefit small,
cohesive special-interest groups at the expense of the general public. This result is due to two
factors: (1) individuals lack sufficient incentives to promote laws that directly benefit the
general public because of free-rider problems; and (2) interest groups have strong incentives to
press for laws that transfer wealth from the general public to themselves. See Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 230-32 (1986).
17 Stigler, supra note 3, at 5, 11-13.
18 See Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma
of Glass-Steagall, 33 Emory L.J. I (1984).
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ical equilibrium, rendering a preexisting arrangement undesirable
from the perspective of the regulated groups. In such instances,
deregulation might become the political-support-maximizing strategy
for a subsequent set of politicians. Where, for example, exogenous
technical factors or general economic forces erode the rents associated
with a particular activity, the demand for the regulatory regime sup-
porting that activity may decline. 19 This diminution in demand ulti-
mately may result in deregulation.2 °
In addition to extracting payments for regulating or for deregulat-
ing, politicians can obtain payments for agreeing not to regulate in a
particular area. As Professor Fred McChesney has explained in an
illuminating article, where private parties have created quasi-rents
through capital investments that can be used only for particularized
purposes, politicians can extract payments in exchange for promises
to refrain from imposing regulations that would expropriate those
investments.21
In a world of high information and transaction costs, the political-
support-maximizing strategy is not always obvious to the politicians
making the relevant decisions. Consequently, the period prior to leg-
islative decisionmaking, which is often characterized by a series of
hearings, fact findings, and related investigations, resembles a form of
auction at which interest groups can express their preferences for par-
ticular regulatory configurations and signal their legislators about the
intensity of these preferences. During this "bidding" process legisla-
tors discover which legislative strategy will allow them to obtain the
most political support.
As presently understood, however, the economic theory of legisla-
tion does not explain why Congress would confer regulatory authority
on state legislatures when it could easily legislate directly. Instead,
the theory appears to imply that the federal government should sup-
ply all law, as deference to state regulators simply allows local
lawmakers to capture for themselves the political support available
for supplying regulation to rent-seeking constituents. It is not surpris-
19 For an insightful discussion of the problem of durability of interest-group bargains, see
Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. &
Econ. 875 (1975).
20 Jarrell, supra note 7; Macey & Haddock, Shirking at the SEC:' The Failure of the
National Market System, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 315.
21 McChesney, supra note 8, at 110-11.
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ing that the economic theory of regulation does not specify a role for
state law: For at least four reasons, obtaining a federal law will be the
strategy of choice for most interest groups seeking to obtain wealth
transfers.
The first factor that suggests that interest groups generally will pre-
fer to obtain rents by invoking federal rather than state law involves
transaction costs. It is simply less expensive to obtain passage of one
federal statute than to obtain passage of fifty state statutes because a
different state legislature must be lobbied in each state.22 Even if
interest groups would benefit marginally by having a myriad of local
statutes, the benefits may not outweigh the transaction costs associ-
ated with obtaining passage of all of those statutes. Only when the
benefits to interest groups of having a series of different local statutes
are higher that the costs of obtaining such statutes would we expect to
observe local statutes.
A related factor is that when statutes are passed at the state level,
political support must still be provided to federal regulators to induce
them to forbear from later preempting the field by enacting a subse-
quent law. In other words, the supremacy clause generally requires
interest groups to pay twice to obtain a state law-once at the state
level and once at the national level.2 3 By contrast, where interest
22 Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 Cornell L.
Rev. 677, 709 (1988). Of course, interest groups are not forced to select between obtaining a
single federal law on the one hand and 50 state laws on the other. An interest-group coalition
can opt for "half a loaf" by obtaining the legislation it prefers in only a few states. At some
point in the process, however, the cost of obtaining a single federal rule becomes lower than
the cost of obtaining a multitude of state-law rules.
Furthermore, as Professor Saul Levmore has pointed out, at times interest groups that
operate at the national level will press for a single nationwide rule in order to avoid problems
of exploitation at the state level. Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention,
69 Va. L. Rev. 563 (1983). This situation will occur when the benefits of a particular rule are
concentrated in one jurisdiction, but the costs are concentrated in other jurisdictions. For
example, a given state may choose to impose an unusually harsh liability rule on
manufacturers of a particular product if none of the manufacturers of that product are located
in that state. In such a situation, the consumers will be more powerful politically than the
producers at the state level. Nationally, however, the producers may dominate the political
process.
23 Even under the most expansive interpretations of the commerce clause, some aspects of
state lawmaking authority are probably immune from federal preemption. For example, in
Penry v. Lynaugh, 57 U.S.L.W. 4958 (U.S. June 26, 1989), the Court held that states possess
the constitutional authority to permit the execution of retarded persons under certain
circumstances. Congress has considered passing legislation to prohibit such executions, but it
is not clear that Congress has such power over the states. It is clear, however, that Congress
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groups are able to obtain federal legislation that preempts the field,
they can avoid the necessity of making payoffs to local politicians.
A third reason interest groups may prefer national law to local law
is that, from an interest group's perspective, federal law is often con-
sidered a higher quality product than state law. One reason for this
belief is that federal bureaucrats and judges are perceived as more
sophisticated than their state rivals and, consequentially, more able to
develop innovative, responsive solutions to interest-group needs. Sim-
ilarly, the fact that greater resources are available to federal regulators
naturally implies that they will have more wealth to extend to inter-
est-group supplicants than will local regulators. Finally, the deals
made at the federal level are likely to be more durable than the deals
made at the state level. This is because the full-time, professional pol-
iticians that dominate at the federal level have considerable reputa-
tional capital invested in the stability of the deals they make.24
Moreover, because of its political independence, the federal judiciary
represents a more reliable enforcement agency for interest-group bar-
gains than generally exists at the local level.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, federal law is harder for
adversely affected parties to avoid than is state law. Regulated enti-
ties often can shift assets or personnel to one state to avoid regulatory
transfers imposed by another state. If, for example, one state imposes
an onerous tax on firms or citizens within its borders, it would be
relatively easy for parties who are adversely affected simply to relo-
cate to another state. The wealth transfers effectuated at the national
level, however, are likely to be harder to avoid than the wealth trans-
fers effectuated at the local level. While exit can be used as a strategy
for avoiding federal law, the costs of exiting to avoid federal law are
generally much higher than the costs of exiting to avoid state law.
For example, when individual states attempted to enact plant-closing
laws, they found existing firms threatening to exit and new firms
refusing to establish plants in such states. For this reason, plant-clos-
has the constitutional authority to intercede in an incredibly broad range of issues traditionally
considered the province of state decisionmaking. The discussion in this Article pertains to
these issues.
24 Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74
Cornell L. Rev. 43, 52-53 (1989).
25 Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 885-87.
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ing laws proved almost wholly ineffective at the state level . 6 By con-
trast, the federal government was able to enact such laws far more
successfully because the burden of relocating outside of the United
States made the avoidance of the federal plant-closing laws
inframarginal for most firms.2 7 Thus, interest groups will favor fed-
eral law over state law because states face stiffer competition from one
another than the federal government faces from other sovereign
nations.z8 This stiffer competition is a manifestation of the fact that
the groups or individuals harmed by interest-group wealth transfers
can easily relocate to avoid the effects of such wealth transfer activity.
As recent events in Eastern Europe have illustrated, the ability to exit
poses severe constraints on the ability of interest groups to achieve
their goals.
For all of these reasons, we observe interest groups exhibiting a
strong preference for federal as opposed to state law in most areas.
This preference enables federal regulators to reap political support by
providing appropriate legislation. Yet we also observe federal regula-
tors voluntarily deferring to local regulators in a variety of contexts.
The economic theory of regulation is in need of some refinement in
order to take account of this fact.
I wish to emphasize that such deference occurs despite the fact that
federal legislators can obtain political support by providing favors
directly to local constituents in certain situations. All members of
Congress have sophisticated, well-staffed offices for the express pur-
pose of delivering favors to local constituents. And, as the recent con-
troversy over the closing of obsolete military bases has made clear,
members of Congress do not view the provision of localized favors as
outside the range of services they profitably can offer their constitu-
ents. 9 In addition, Professors Barry Weingast and William Marshall
26 Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 Duke L.J. 173, 195-96.
27 Id. at 196-97.
28 See R. McKenzie & G. Tullock, Modem Political Economy: An Introduction to
Economics 398-400 (1978) (comparing the benefits of competition among governments with
the advantages and disadvantages of centralization).
29 Indeed, the need for legislators to deliver favors for their constituents back home, a
commonplace observation in political science, explains the fact that logrolling is an effective
political practice. See D. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 31-33 (1974);
Weingast & Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like
Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 132 (1988).
1990]
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recently have shown how the structure of the committee system
within Congress can resolve certain contracting problems that exist
among members of Congress, thereby enhancing the ability of legisla-
tors to provide discrete benefits to local constituencies.30 Consistent
with this analysis, a variety of empirical studies have demonstrated
that members of particular congressional committees enjoy dispropor-
tionate success at obtaining local pork-barrel projects from legislation
originating in their committees.3'
The riddle here is that despite the fact that Congress possesses the
power to preempt state law and the ability to use its lawmaking power
to provide highly localized benefits to interested groups, it often
chooses not to do so. The following Part explores the situations in
which Congress will maximize political support by granting a regula-
tory "franchise" to local regulators.32
II. STATE LAW AS THE POLITICAL-SUPPORT-MAXIMIZING
SOLUTION
The above discussion of public-choice theory implies that when the
political support that can be obtained from deference to local
lawmakers is greater than the political support to be derived from
direct federal regulation, we can expect federal regulators to defer to
the states. At least three sets of conditions can be identified in which
such deference will be the political-support-maximizing solution. The
first is where interest groups have made an expropriable investment in
30 Weingast & Marshall, supra note 29, at 144.
31 See Macey, supra note 24, at 55 (summarizing the evidence).
32 The above discussion also suggests the need for a minor modification of McChesney's
powerful point about rent extraction. See text accompanying note 21. McChesney's model
hypothesizes a world in which economic activities will not be regulated if Congress declines to
regulate them. But if Congress simply declines to regulate without doing more, state
governments can capture any available rents from regulating (or from declining to regulate)
that otherwise would have gone to members of Congress. In other words, where the political-
support-maximizing solution for federal regulators is to forbear from regulating, they must act
affirmatively to prevent local governments from regulating. Congress can do this by passing
specific enactments that do not change the state of the law, but that clearly supersede specific
state laws. Congress also can act by expressing a desire to supersede local regulations or by
passing a regulatory scheme under which local laws are invalid because they impermissibly
interfere with the effectuation of congressional objectives. In addition, courts on occasion will
invoke the so-called "dormant commerce clause" to invalidate state legislation that does not
conflict with any federal statute, but that infringes upon interstate commerce. See J. Nowak,
R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 12, § 9.3.
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a particular set of local regulations. For example, over time local reg-
ulators may have developed particularized expertise in a specific sub-
ject area, or they may have developed a long-term contractual
relationship with one or more interest groups through a pattern of
repeat dealings. Where these conditions obtain, existing local regula-
tion takes the form of an income-producing capital asset. Federal pre-
emption in these areas would dissipate the value of this asset. Interest
groups and local politicians therefore have an incentive to provide
political support to Congress in exchange for Congress's agreement
not to preempt these local regulations.
The second set of circumstances under which we are likely to
observe federal deference to local regulators is where the political-
support-maximizing solution for a particular regulatory issue differs
markedly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Federal law is an unwieldy
device for maximizing aggregate political support where there is a
complex set of differing local political optima caused by local or spa-
tial monopolies. In such circumstances, local regulators will be the
best source for the complex matrix of differing regulatory schemes
necessary to provide the diverse set of arrangements necessary to ben-
efit the relevant groups.
A third set of conditions under which we will observe deference to
state regulators is derived directly from Professor Morris Fiorina's
earlier work on the delegation of legislative authority to administra-
tive agencies.33 As Fiorina pointed out, if Congress regulates in the
form of a specific-that is, judicially enforceable-statute, members
of Congress "engenderfl the unalloyed approval of those benefited and
the disapproval of those harmed. ' 34 Fiorina observed that delegating
a decision to a regulatory agency has the advantage of permitting
Congress to remove the blame for particularly controversial legisla-
tion from its own shoulders onto those of the relevant agency.
Fiorina's analysis can be extended from administrative agencies to
include explicit or implicit delegations of legislative power to state
governments. Indeed, Congress often can shift the blame for contro-
versial enactments even more effectively by deferring to state legisla-
tors than by deferring to administrative agencies because Congress
33 Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 Pub. Choice 33 (1982).
34 Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev.
1, 56 (1983) (describing Fiorina's conclusions).
1990]
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often is considered at least partially accountable for the actions of the
latter. By contrast, actions by state legislatures may bring excoriation
on state legislators and cries for federal preemption, but will only
rarely bring condemnation by Congress itself.3 5
The discussion that follows will elaborate on the conditions that
will permit local law to dominate national law under an economic
theory of regulation.
A. The Protection of Asset-Specific Investments
When an individual state creates a regulatory regime that accumu-
lates particularized expertise, reputational value, or human capital in
a specific subject area, that regulatory scheme represents a capital
asset of that state. The beneficiaries of the state-law regulatory regime
will be willing to pay to retain the current regulatory structure in the
face of threatened federal intervention. Whenever existing, state-cre-
ated rents on such assets are greater than the rents that can be created
by federal regulation, the price the beneficiaries of the state regulation
will pay Congress in return for retention of state control will be
greater than the political support Congress could obtain by interven-
ing directly. This situation represents a variation on McChesney's
model of regulatory forbearance. Under McChesney's model, interest
groups provide political support in return for an agreement to refrain
from regulating. In this model, interest groups provide political sup-
port to retain an existing, alternative regulatory regime.
An example of this phenomenon involves the provision of corporate
law by state legislatures. For years there has been a fierce debate
about the efficacy of the jurisdictional competition for corporate char-
ters that continues to rage among the states. One group contends that
state law is preferable because competition among the states produces
efficient corporate laws that maximize firm value and shareholder
35 Congress will be particularly inclined to defer legislative authority to state legislatures
rather than to administrative agencies whenever the relevant issues can be resolved by a
discrete declaration of law, rather than by the ongoing series of interpretations that are the
standard fare of administrative agencies. While ongoing regulation may present Congress with
later opportunities to gain political support, simple, discrete matters do not. The abortion
controversy thus presents a paradigmatic example of an issue that Congress will relegate to the
states. See infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
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wealth.36 A competing group argues that federal law ought to pre-
empt state law because competition among the states for corporate
chartering revenues has led to an undesirable "race to the bottom" in
which various states compete to provide the set of laws that best facil-
itate the transfer of wealth from shareholders to managers.37
But all states are not equal in the jurisdictional competition for cor-
porate charters. One state, Delaware, has consistently led the field for
the past fifty years.38 Over forty percent of all companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange are chartered in Delaware, 39 and, even
more significantly, eighty-two percent of all firms move to Delaware
when they elect to reincorporate from the state in which they origi-
nally obtained their charter.'
Delaware's dominance in the market for corporate charters is not a
consequence of a unique willingness to provide corporate laws that
chartering firms find attractive. Many states have manifested an
eagerness to do this in order to obtain a greater share of the significant
revenues associated with granting state charters. Nor is Delaware's
dominance a consequence of its greater technical expertise in promul-
gating a sophisticated and useful body of doctrine. Other states could
easily replicate, or even improve upon, Delaware's body of doctrine.4a
Indeed, one cannot explain Delaware's dominance in the jurisdic-
tional competition for corporate charters solely with reference to its
distinctive corporate code because its corporate code is, in fact, not
particularly remarkable or even distinguishable from that of other
states.
36 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395 (1983);
Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal
Stud. 251 (1977).
37 See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(describing the competition among the states for corporate chartering revenues as a race "not
of diligence but of laxity"); R. Nader, M. Green & J. Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation
(1976); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663,
666 (1974) (describing this competition as a "race for the bottom"); Jennings, Federalization of
Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way?, 31 Bus. Law. 991 (1976).
3s Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 225 (1985).
39 See I N.Y. Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) 725-99 (1989).
40 Romano, supra note 38, at 244.
41 Nevada has attempted to duplicate Delaware's doctrine. See Macey & Miller, Toward an
Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 488 (1987).
Recently, Pennsylvania also promulgated laws that appear to offer management a mere
attractive package.
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Rather, Delaware dominates the jurisdictional competition for cor-
porate charters because of the nature of that competitive process.
Delaware is a small state. It obtains an extremely high proportion of
its budget (sixteen percent) from franchise taxes on corporate charter-
ing.42 Delaware relies on these revenues more than other states
because for other states, revenues from corporate chartering represent
only a small portion of their total budget. In other words, the high
percentage of Delaware's budget that is derived from chartering reve-
nues represents a credible (bonded) promise that the state will not
renege on its earlier promise to respond in consistent ways to new
phenomena.43 Delaware has been able to retain its dominance
because it is able to offer a reliable promise that its corporation law
will remain highly attractive to managers in the future.' 4 Competing
states are unable to match Delaware's promise of future performance
because they cannot offer the same credible bond.
In exchange for the high percentage of state revenues derived from
corporate chartering, Delaware also offers current and prospective
charterers a highly specialized bar and a judiciary with particularized
experience and expertise in corporate law.45 Numerous attorneys,
investment bankers, and corporate officers and directors both in and
out of Delaware have made large investments of human capital that
are specific to Delaware; hence, they have come to share Delaware's
large stake in the preservation of its dominant position in the competi-
tion for corporate charters. These groups have learned the rules,
practices, and traditions of the Delaware legislature and the philoso-
phies of its judges, and they have familiarized themselves with the
way the Delaware corporate code is likely to be interpreted.
In other words, the jurisdictional competition for corporate char-
ters "is characterized by bilateral investment in assets that are specific
to the chartering transaction, involving human capital on the firm side
and the corporate legal system on the state side."46 In sum, Delaware
42 Romano, supra note 38, at 240-41.
43 This theory of Delaware's dominance was first propounded by Professor Roberta
Romano. See id. at 226.
44 Id. at 226-27.
45 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 41, at 488 (observing that "Delaware judges,
corporate attorneys, and legislators are more knowledgeable about and have a greater interest
in corporate law than do people with similar positions in other states"); Meyers, Showdown in
Delaware: The Battle to Shape Takeover Law, Institutional Investor, Feb. 1989, at 64.
46 Romano, supra note 38, at 226.
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is committed to having a reliable and responsive system of corporate
laws.
But the benefits of Delaware's dominant position in the competition
for corporate charters are not randomly distributed. Rather, numer-
ous interest groups, but particularly the Delaware corporate bar, ben-
efit from Delaware's current dominant position.47 Indeed, building on
the earlier work of Professor Roberta Romano, Professor Geoffrey
Miller and I have elsewhere shown that the precise contours of much
of Delaware's corporate law can be explained by the fact that it effec-
tively channels litigation into the state's courts.4"
Thus, Delaware's dominant position in the market for corporate
charters represents a valuable capital asset that generates revenues for
Delaware corporations, corporate lawyers, investment bankers, and
for the state itself. All of these groups have a large stake in seeing
that Delaware retains its dominant position so that their specific capi-
tal investments will not be dissipated. These capital assets would be
destroyed if the federal government enacted a pervasive system of fed-
eral corporate law that preempted the field. All of these groups,
whatever their political disposition on issues of federalism generally
or corporate governance in particular, have an incentive to work to
avoid federal preemption. Thus, Congress can amass significant polit-
ical support by refraining from preempting state law in this area. The
fact that Congress has not enacted a national corporate law indicates
that deference to the states is in fact its political-support-maximizing
solution.
While public-choice theory thus offers an explanation for the persis-
tence of state chartering, the phenomenon is wholly inconsistent with
a public-interest view of federalism. Even the most ardent supporters
of federalism recognize that national solutions are desirable in situa-
tions in which externalities exist, such as when a particular state can
capture most of the benefits from regulating while bearing few of the
costs associated with its regulatory regime.4 9 But continued state reg-
ulation of corporate chartering permits one small state, Delaware, to
enact laws that are truly national in focus. The consequences of these
laws are felt nationally, while the benefits of the regulatory regime
47 Macey & Miller, supra note 41, at 501-02.
48 Id.
49 See McConnell, supra note 2, at 1495.
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accrue disproportionately to interest groups within Delaware.5°
While other areas have not been studied in the same detail as Dela-
ware's corporate law, it appears that the Delaware phenomenon is not
unique. For example, Connecticut is well known for having devel-
oped specialized expertise in the provision of regulation for the insur-
ance industry. To protect this asset, interest groups successfully have
persuaded Congress not to displace state insurance regulation, despite
the fact that there has been significant federal intervention in all other
aspects of the financial services industry, particularly banking and
securities.
Thus, when the Supreme Court reversed an 1868 decision5 and
held that states no longer had exclusive control of the insurance
industry, 52 Congress responded by passing the McCarran-Ferguson
Act less than a year later.5 3 The McCarran-Ferguson Act specifically
deferred regulatory authority over insurance to the states in order to
"secure more adequate regulation" over the industry. 4 The McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act, which has been described as a "sweeping" authori-
zation by Congress of state regulation,55 declared that the power to
regulate the insurance industry would remain with the states and that
no act of Congress should be interpreted as implicitly invalidating any
state insurance regulation unless the congressional act specifically
related to the business of insurance.5 6
50 See Macey & Miller, supra note 41, at 490-98.
51 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
52 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
53 McCarran-Ferguson Act, cl. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1988)).
54 H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670,
673.
55 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-33, at 526 (2d ed. 1988).
56 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988):
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part
of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.
Exempting the insurance companies from the operation of the commerce clause turned out
to be something of a mixed blessing for the insurance industry. As a consequence of the Act,
states were able to impose taxes that discriminated against out-of-state insurance companies
without fear that the taxes would be struck down as violative of the commerce clause. See
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (upholding a South Carolina tax that
charged a three percent premium on out-of-state insurance firms). The Supreme Court came
to the rescue of the insurance industry almost 40 years later. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (holding that an Alabama law imposing higher gross premiums on
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The McCarran-Ferguson Act was paraded to the public as a bill to
protect states' rights. 7 In fact, the bill was the product of the Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners, which drafted a statute and
presented it to Congress."' The bill proposed by the state insurance
commissioners ultimately was accepted by Congress, although various
proposals to exclude the insurance industry from the antitrust laws
were rejected.5 9
Interestingly, the first significant incursion on the states' franchise
to regulate the insurance industry has come in the area of products
liability. Manufacturers persuaded Congress to pass the Product Lia-
bility Risk Retention Act of 19 8 1 " in order to "reduce the problem of
the rising cost of product liability insurance by permitting product
manufacturers to purchase insurance on a group basis. '61
B. State Law as a Customized Response to Local Interest Groups
The fifty states that comprise the union differ dramatically in his-
tory, demography, economic orientation, and natural endowment.
Consequently, it is not surprising that patterns of interest-group
behavior differ significantly from state to state, and even from locality
to locality. The political-support-maximizing equilibrium may
require favoring a certain interest group in one state and a different
interest group in another. The issue of gun control is a good example
of this phenomenon. In general, states with largely urban populations
tend to favor gun control while states with rural populations often
prefer to provide citizens with broad rights to own and carry guns.
The implication of such variety is that the political-support-maxi-
mizing outcome for politicians in one state may not be the political-
support-maximizing solution for politicians in another. And when
interest-group preferences are aggregated, the political-support-maxi-
mizing solution at the national level may differ from many, perhaps
most, of the local solutions. Inevitably, a national rule will impose
non-Alabama insurance companies would violate the equal protection clause if it were not
related to a legitimate state interest).
57 See 90 Cong. Rec. A4403 (1944) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
58 Id. at A4403-07.
59 See id. at A4405 (setting forth the proposals to exclude insurance industry from the
antitrust laws, which proposals were not incorporated into the legislation as passed).
60 Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3904 (1988)).
61 H.R. Rep. No. 190, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1432, 1432.
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high costs on some interest groups that have benefited from a conflict-
ing local rule.62 Interest groups that are likely to be disappointed by
or indifferent to a national solution will pay to have matters resolved
at the local level.
Of course, the transaction costs of obtaining individualized local
rules likely will exceed the transaction costs associated with obtaining
a single national rule. Only when the increase in political support
that Congress can gain from deferring to the states outweighs, at the
margin, the increase in transaction costs associated with promulgating
a multitude of local rules will we expect to observe local instead of
national rules.
Spatial monopolies such as those conferred by zoning laws repre-
sent the classic situation in which interest groups and politicians will
prefer a myriad of local laws to a single federal rule.63 A uniform
zoning law passed at the national level would deprive innumerable
local lawmakers of the ability to capture the rents associated with
passing zoning laws and variances that favor local interest groups by
providing them with 9patial monopolies. Federal regulators can cap-
ture rents as well by agreeing to defer to such local lawmakers.
Furthermore, some of the factors that usually cause interest groups
to favor federal laws over state laws are absent where the interest
groups are seeking to protect spatial monopolies. First, while
obtaining a single federal statute generally will be cheaper than
obtaining fifty local laws, the costs of obtaining a single federal law
generally will be greater than the costs of obtaining one local law.
And one local law is all that is necessary to protect a spatial monop-
oly. Second, the cost of compensating federal lawmakers for declining
to regulate spatial monopolies will probably be low because the cost of
replicating this vast regulatory regime at the federal level is likely to
be prohibitive, thus making it an unattractive prospect for federal
62 See also Butler & Macey, supra note 22 (applying the theory presented here to the state
and federal regulation of branch banking).
63 A spatial monopoly is a monopoly that arises because one producer is able to locate at a
sufficient distance from its competitors such that consumers must incur transaction costs to
obtain goods produced by rivals. The producer can tack onto the competitive price of its
goods an amount up to the amount of the transaction cost that the consumer would have to
pay to do business elsewhere. Because different businesses are likely to dominate in different
locales, the zoning law that provides the most political support for lawmakers in one
jurisdiction is likely to differ markedly from that which provides the most political support for
the lawmakers in another jurisdiction.
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intervention. Finally, competition among states will not deter local
lawmakers from exploiting spatial monopolies because, by definition,
such locational advantages cannot be transported.
State laws regarding branch banking represent a particular type of
"zoning" restriction and provide an instructive example of federal
deference to state regulators to protect a variety of localized spatial
monopolies.' 4 States, with the aid of the federal government, have
adopted a diverse panoply of laws designed to protect local banking
cartels in order to maximize the political support received from
banks. In some states these cartels are best protected by eliminating
branch banking altogether. In other states, the political-support-max-
imizing solution has been to adopt home office protection statutes,
which prohibit branching into the town or city where another bank
maintains its home office. Other states prohibit banks from branching
into counties that are not contiguous to the county in which the bank
maintains its main office. Still others prohibit banks from branching
into unincorporated areas of noncontiguous counties or into commu-
nities with less than a fixed number of residents. This farrago of laws
is necessary to serve the needs of the variegated web of banking inter-
ests that exist within the states.
The predominant effect of these banking laws is local in nature. A
single, uniform federal rule would be optimal from the perspective of
some, but not all, local interest groups. By allowing local law to pre-
vail, political-support-maximizing federal regulators can maximize
the total sum of rents in the system.65 Thus, state regulators survive
to implement these sorts of laws, and federal regulators obtain payoffs
for agreeing to defer to them.
At first blush, the analysis presented here appears to conform to the
analysis contained in a public-interest model of federalism. A public-
interest model would prescribe that local law should dominate when-
ever regulations have a purely local effect, while national law should
dominate whenever regulations have a predominately national
64 Butler & Macey, supra note 22, at 708.
65 Obviously, payment problems and other contracting problems will hamper the ability of
interest groups and politicians to forge agreements. See Macey, supra note 24, at 52-56
(discussing structural solutions to the contracting problem). In addition, as an empirical
matter, it is very hard to link individual political payments by interest groups to specific
promises by politicians. Clearly, however, the fact that such payments are made is strong
evidence that interest groups believe they are receiving something in return.
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effect.6 6 The public-interest model, however, assumes that the full
costs and benefits of a particular legal regime to the public is what
motivates the local decisionmaker, while the model presented here
focuses on the fact that interest groups have a strong incentive to
press for local solutions to their regulatory problems.
Of course, over a wide range of issues, the outcomes predicted by
the public-interest model will be identical to those predicted by the
interest-group model when the political-support-maximizing solution
varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The crucial distinction
lies in the process that leads to the predicted outcomes. The zoning
hypothetical invoked above provides a useful illustration. A public-
interest model would predict that zoning rules will be locally pro-
duced because virtually all of the costs and benefits of zoning ordi-
nances are local. Local politicians, according to the public-interest
model, enact the zoning ordinances that respond to "local conditions
and tastes."6 7 The public-choice model, on the other hand, predicts
that zoning laws are passed because such laws benefit local special-
interest groups by facilitating the creation of spatial monopolies. A
striking example of this phenomenon are local zoning rules that pro-
hibit liquor stores from locating too close together. Such rules, which
are quite common, benefit existing liquor stores at the expense of new-
comers. Similarly, zoning laws prescribing housing densities and
imposing acreage restrictions on residential property also benefit local
interests at the expense of outsiders.
C. Federal Deference as Risk Avoidance
In the spatial monopoly scenario illustrated above, federal legisla-
tors are able to reap political support by allowing interest groups to
obtain customized local regulations from state regulators. Congress
might also defer to the states in order to avoid the loss of political
support on issues for which there is no clear national consensus. Just
as passing the right kinds of laws can benefit lawmakers by enabling
them to obtain political support, passing the wrong kinds of laws can
result in a diminution of political support.68 And, in a world of
66 See McConnell, supra note 2, at 1492-1511.
67 Id. at 1493.
68 The same, of course, is true in the private sector. Just as good business decisions increase
the wealth of decisionmakers in the private sector, bad business decisions are costly.
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imperfect information, lawmakers will not always be certain of
whether the political costs to them of passing a particular statute out-
weigh the benefits. As Professors Peter Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn,
and Glen Robinson have observed, a politician "may not know what
his constituents want, how regulation will affect them, and which
affected [interest] group is stronger. "69
Professor Fiorina and Kenneth Shepsle have observed that one
strategy for maximizing political support under conditions of uncer-
tainty is to delegate the matter to an administrative agency.7°
Another strategy will be to turn the matter to be regulated over to the
states. Indeed, deferring a controversial regulatory matter to the
states may insulate Congress from political fallout even more effec-
tively than turning the matter over to an administrative agency. Con-
gress is perceived as having more control over the actions of
administrative agencies than of state legislatures; consequently, Con-
gress is more likely to be held accountable for regulatory action taken
by administrative agencies than it is for similar actions taken by
states. In addition, Congress can justify virtually any decision to dele-
gate a controversial policy matter to the states simply by uttering
vague tributes to the virtues of federalism.
On the other hand, delegation to federal administrative agencies
has certain advantages over delegations to the states. Specifically, in a
complex area, such as establishing a comprehensive environmental
policy, Congress can garner political support by passing a generalized
statute containing vague platitudes about the virtues of a sound envi-
ronment and then setting up a complex administrative agehcy that
will respond to the interests of the regulated. The general public,
which strongly favored the enactment of environmental safeguards,
will find it too costly to monitor the agency's actions. Organized
groups, by contrast, "will be unrelenting in their efforts to influence
the day-to-day details of legislation's implementation. ' 71 Congress
can thus engender political support (or at least avoid the loss of sup-
69 Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 34, at 60.
70 Professor Fiorina draws the connection between the formation of administrative agencies
and legislative ambiguity most explicitly. See Fiorina, supra note 33, at 55-57; see also Shepsle,
The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 555
(1972) (observing that the optimal political strategy for politicians often involves ambiguity);
Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 34, at 33 (observing that Shepsle's strategy of
ambiguity often involves the delegation of authority to an administrative agency).
71 Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 191, 197 (1988).
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port) from the general public through the initial delegation, while its
subsequent administration provides opportunities to extract political
support from interest groups disappointed with the original enact-
ment. On the other hand, simple, discrete matters that can be easily
understood and monitored by the public do not provide opportunities
for interest groups to attempt to alter the legislation ex post by influ-
encing the way the administrative agency interprets it. Thus, when a
national political-support-maximizing course is not apparent, the
issue will be delegated to the states.
Moreover, as with delegations to administrative agencies, Congress
always can decide to regulate when and if interest-group political sup-
port galvanizes around a particular regulatory solution, thereby sig-
naling Congress that it can intervene safely. Similarly, individual
members of Congress also can obtain political support on matters tra-
ditionally settled by state law by acting as agents for powerful constit-
uencies in their dealings with state legislators. In an era in which the
federal government provides considerable funding of state-sponsored
projects through direct grants and matching funds, state representa-
tives have much to gain by appeasing Congress. Another strategy for
garnering political support on matters traditionally relegated to state
law is for federal regulators occasionally to threaten to regulate in
these areas. Finally, individual members of Congress can obtain polit-
ical support by acting entrepreneurially, identifying issues currently
being regulated nationally and offering to sponsor legislation that
would benefit interest groups by turning the issues over to local
control.
The responsibility-shifting model described above appears to apply
with great force to the abortion controversy. Unlike desegregation,
which grudgingly was accepted as a way of life after the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,72 the issue of abor-
tion has become increasingly controversial since the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade,7 3 which invalidated state laws banning abor-
tion. Emotions about the legality of abortion run extremely high,
with groups on both sides of the debate expressing a willingness to
confer or withdraw political support to particular candidates on the
72 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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basis of this single issue.74
Now, in the wake of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 7
Congress conceivably could preempt state action on the issue of abor-
tion, either by making abortion legal or by preempting the field in
some other way, perhaps by establishing an administrative agency
with exclusive authority to promulgate rules and guidelines governing
abortion.76 Yet there is little doubt that Congress will refrain from
stepping in and preempting the field. It is clear that Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services leaves the abortion issue in the hands of the
states, which now have almost exclusive responsibility for regulating
in this area, despite the fact that Congress often regulates issues of far
less notoriety or national significance.77
States are not being given the responsibility for regulating abortion
because there is anything about the issue that suggests that states are a
more appropriate or logical regulatory forum than the federal govern-
ment. Clearly, a fetus in New York cannot be philosophically distin-
guished from a fetus in Alabama, any more than a New York woman
can be said to possess a right to privacy or individual autonomy that
differs from that of a woman in Alabama. Indeed, in an issue of simi-
larly local concern, access to schooling for the handicapped, the fed-
eral government has taken an extremely active role, compelling states
to provide appropriate educational opportunities for all students,
including those in need of special education due to mental defects or
retardation.
Rather, states are given the responsibility for regulating abortions
because they provide a far safer forum from the perspective of
74 See Apple, Limits on Abortion Seem Less Likely, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at AI, col.
1 (describing poll showing that "abortion remains one of the most divisive subjects in
American life").
75 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). In Webster, the Supreme Court upheld a provision of a Missouri
law that requires doctors to ascertain whether a fetus is viable by performing "such medical
examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the unborn child's gestational age,
weight, and lung maturity" before performing an abortion on any woman believed to be 20 or
more weeks pregnant. Id. at 3043.
76 In 1983, for example, the so-called Hatch-Eagleton amendment to the Constitution, S.J.
Res. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S95 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983), which would have
overturned Roe v. Wade and allowed Congress and the states to pass new laws restricting or
prohibiting abortion, was defeated after vigorous debate. 129 Cong. Rec. 59310 (daily ed. June
28, 1983).
77 Medoff, Constituencies, Ideology, and the Demand for Abortion Legislation, 60 Pub.
Choice 185, 185 (1989).
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national politicians than does the federal government. Unlike a com-
plicated issue such as the environment, Congress cannot avoid the
political fallout associated with abortion by delegating the matter to
an administrative agency. The issue is too straightforward. As one
political commentator has observed, "[a]bortion is... a question of
conscience with two clear, opposing positions, there's hardly a hedge
to hide behind. Basically, you're on one side or the other. '78
Opinions on the abortion issue vary widely among groups.7 9
Groups taking a strong position in favor of a woman's right to choose
to have an abortion include women of childbearing age in white collar
occupations, for whom the cost of having children is higher than for
other women, 80 and nonwhite women, who are "much more likely to
use abortion . . . than whites."81 The group most vociferously
opposed to abortion, of course, is fundamentalist Christians, a group
that is "unified and adamant in its opposition to abortion. ' 82 In addi-
tion, a group that has been identified as the "passive poor,"83 who are
older, Southern, and Democratic, are strongly opposed to abortion.
Forty-seven percent of this group "favor changing laws to make it
s Weisberg, Abortion Olympics, New Republic, Feb. 12, 1990, at 12.
79 Netter, An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Congressional Voting on
Federal Financing of Abortions and the ERA, 14 J. Legal Stud. 245, 253 (1985).
80 Kristin Luker cites the following argument as a "theme" among women who support the
right to abortion on demand:
For women to achieve any kind of equality in the employment market requires
acceptance by society that they are in control of their reproductive lives.... Legalized
abortion ... is certainly a factor in freeing women from the blanket accusation that
they're going to be divided in their loyalty to their career because they're going to have
children.
K. Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 119 (1984); see also Mincer, Market
Prices, Opportunity Costs, and Income Effects, in Measurement in Economics: Studies in
Mathematical Economics and Econometrics in Memory of Yehuda Grunfeld 67, 75-79 (1963)
(finding an inverse relationship between earnings of women in white-collar occupations and
their "fertility rate").
81 MedofF, supra note 77, at 187. Between 1973 and 1980, the abortion rate increased by
162% for nonwhite women but only by 106% for white women: By 1980 the abortion rate of
nonwhite women (56.8 per thousand) was more than double that of white women (24.3 per
thousand). Id. Thus, it is not surprising that "while abortion tends to be viewed as a women's
liberation issue, the civil rights movement (both black and Latin) has tended to support legal
abortion on the grounds that it is a social and civil rights issue." Id.
82 Id. Although the Roman Catholic church officially opposes abortion, American
Catholics as individuals are split on the issue, thus nullifying the group's political impact with
respect to this issue. Id.
83 See N. Ornstein, A. Kohut & L. McCarthy, The People, the Press, and Politics: The
Times Mirror Study of the American Electorate 17 (1988).
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more difficult for a woman to get an abortion," and forty percent
strongly identify themselves as "supporter[s] of the anti-abortion
movement. '8
4
It is important to distinguish an important, albeit subtle, difference
between the political climate surrounding the abortion debate, which
involves responsibility shifting, and that which surrounds an issue
such as gun control, which involves differing local optima among var-
ious political subdivisions. The gun control issue is delegated to local
governments because the political-support-maximizing solution varies
dramatically across localities. It is not surprising that rural counties
in Georgia support citizens' rights to bear arms, while Massachu-
setts's citizens support strict gun control measures.
But, as the recent gubernatorial elections in Florida, Virginia, and
New Jersey illustrated, the political climate surrounding the abortion
issue is clouded with uncertainty. Even at local levels there was
uncertainty both about how prominent abortion would be as a polit-
ical issue and about what the political-support-maximizing solution
would be for particular politicians.8 Perhaps the strongest indication
of the ambiguity of the abortion issue was the extent to which candi-
dates to elected office modified the tone or substance of their stance on
the issue.8 6 These modifications show that the politicians made erro-
neous predictions about the political-support-maximizing outcome
and had to alter their positions to survive.
Many politicians predicted that the Court's departure from the
principles espoused in Roe v. Wade would benefit the Republican
Party, particularly in the South, where there appeared to be strong
support for legal curbs on the right to obtain an abortion. Others,
however, noted that interest groups supporting women's reproductive
choice had not had any incentive to galvanize into an effective polit-
ical coalition while Roe was still good law, but that such groups might
84 Id. at 36.
85 Apple, supra note 74, at A13, col. I (noting that "[a] less polarized, more ambiguous
political situation has resulted, in which abortion sometimes counts a lot and sometimes does
not, and in which it is sometimes hard to tell who is benefiting from the issue and who is not");
Pressman, Abortion Politics: U.S. Court Ruling Changes the Political Landscape, Cal. J., Oct.
1989, at 395, 396 (quoting a consultant to the California Assembly's Republican Caucus as
saying that "both sides [of the abortion issue] would agree that we don't really know which
side has the upper hand .... [I]t's fairly tight.").
86 See Weisberg, supra note 78, at 14-15 (describing changes in stance on the abortion issue
of various politicians).
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emerge as an effective counter to the so-called right-to-life movement
if significant changes were to occur in the legal landscape.87
Thus, unlike the situation with gun control, the abortion issue is
clbuded with uncertainty. Congress is able to avoid much of the polit-
ical cost associated with this uncertainty by hiding behind the shield
of "federalism." Local politicians are not. Gun control involves a
situation in which the political-support-maximizing solution is far
more clear to politicians in the individual states than it is at the
national level. Abortion involves an issue in which uncertainty and
risk exist at all levels of political life. Very few politicians can afford
to take a stand on this issue without risking serious political repercus-
sions. Thus, for Congress, the political-support-maximizing solution
to the abortion issue is to shift the risk of error to the states.
III. CONCLUSION
This Article has identified three situations in which'federal
lawmakers will maximize political support for themselves by relegat-
ing regulatory authority to state officials. The first is where existing
state law has created expropriable quasi-rents through the develop-
ment of asset-specific investments whose continued value depends on
the perpetuation of such laws. The second is when a single national
rule, by permitting new entry, would deprive local interest groups of
the advantage of an existing spatial monopoly. Finally, we have seen
that federal lawmakers, who often must act under conditions of
uncertainty, sometimes will wish to avoid the political fallout that
accompanies particularly controversial decisions. Under these condi-
tions, federal politicians will find that the best solution will be to rele-
gate matters to state legislators. Thus, this Article has extended the
economic theory of regulation to include an explanation of the gains
available to federal officials from delegating regulatory matters to
state and local officials. The ability to confer or withhold regulatory
authority from state officials under the supremacy clause is a consid-
erable source of rents at the national level.
87 Apple, supra note 74, at A13, col. 1 (observing that "[i]n the last few years, the anti-
abortion advocates tended to dominate the national debate, and their opponents were
somewhat quiescent. But... [Webster] has awakened the defenders of abortion, and their
voices have reached politicians.").
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Many who have recognized the costs of public-sector activities in
the United States have extolled the virtues of delegating such activi-
ties to state governments. I wish to emphasize in closing that nothing
in the foregoing discussion is inconsistent with the traditional defense
of a strong federalist system as a device for achieving a more efficient
legal system by encouraging competition among the states. Rather,
the point is that the supremacy clause, which permits Congress to
trump the states whenever it sees fit, undermines much of the effect of
jurisdictional competition among states in the provision of law.
From a public-choice perspective, the federalist system can only be
viewed as a mechanism that provides a complement rather than a sub-
stitute for federal law as a mechanism by which interest groups can
exchange political support for wealth transfers. Deferring regulatory
matters to the state legislatures must take its place alongside the other
strategies by which federal politicians can offer wealth transfers to
interest groups in exchange for political support.
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